192
165 inequality rather than values of freedom, equality, and tolerance.
COGNITIVE SOPHISTICATION AS THE MEDIATING LINK
170 14 One way to begin to resolve these competing claims is to focus on the qualities (e.g., reasoning
processes, value commitments, etc.) that education is assumed to impart (Sniderman, Brody, and
Kuklinski, 1984). Students of political tolerance have not devoted much attention to examining the process
175 through which education is held to relate to tolerance. Only a
few studies have set out to directly measure
the intervening characteristics and processes that higher levels of education are purported to set into
operation. Zeilman and Sears (1971) found that tolerance for free speech among a large sample of
180 California schoolchildren age 9 to 14 was positively related to a measure of divergent self-esteem.
Divergent self-esteem was defined as an ability to entertain novel and unusual thoughts. Glock et al. (1975)
found that cognitive sophistication, as measured by intellectual interests, openness to new ideas, and
185 willingness to risk uncertainty and ambiguity, reduced anti-Semitism. McClosky and Brill (1983) reported
that measures of political knowledge and of general intellectuality were related to an omnibus civil liberties
scale.
15 But this research has either relied upon unusual samples, was unconcerned with assessing whether
190 cognitive sophistication mediates education effects, or failed to consider cognitive sophistication in the
context of other factors known to influence tolerance. The reasons why education is related to tolerance
need to be pursued more directly. We suspect that the conceptual complexity and sophistication of the
195 reasoning process itself is important, not years of education per se. Our first hypothesis, then, is that
cognitive sophistication largely mediates the relationship between education and tolerance. In addition, we
expect cognitive sophistication to exert effects on tolerance above and beyond other influences such s
200 those of gender, race, region, age, urbanicity, ideology, and religion.
CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING TOLERANCE
16 To this point we have treated tolerance as a concept that enjoys a widely understood, perhaps even
205 straightforward meaning. There are several usages now available in the lirerature, two of particular
importance. Much of the political tolerance research treats any expression of support for concrete use of a
civil liberty as an expression of tolerance (Lawrence, 1976; McClosky and Brill, 1983). This assumption
210 seems reasonable insofar as researchers have been careful to select groups well outside the social and
political mainstream. Sullivan and colleagues challenged this view, however, arguing that tolerance
presupposes explicit disapproval of the group or activity in question (see also Jackman, 1978). This claim
215 has two immediate implications for measurement strategies and tests of theoretical
ideas: first, and
minimally, tolerance measures should ask about groups from both ends of the political spectrum; and
second, it is essential to assess whether the person approves or disapproves of the target group.
220
17 Conclusions about the effects of education on tolerance may vary substantially by which definition
of tolerance underlies the research. For example, contrary to previous literature, Sullivan and colleagues
found no direct effect of education on their «content-controlled» measure of tolerance. This measure asked
225 respondents to identify their least-liked group rather than eliciting reactions to a group preselected by the
researcher. Although education tended to be related to the political ideology of the least-liked groups, with
the highly educated tending to select right-wing groups, its effect on tolerance was small and mediated by
230 political ideology and personality measures. Thus, educatoion did have some of the traditionally antici-
pated psychological consequences
more secure and flexible orientations but no strong effect, direct
or indirect, on levels of tolerance.
235 18 The large number of previous studies that found education to have effects on tolerance stand in sharp
contrast to the results of Sullivan and colleagues. We propose to test some of these ideas; in particular, we
undertake a stringent test of the education-tolerance hypothesis. Our second major hypothesis is\that
240 education enhances tolerance even when the target group is disapproved or disliked. That is, higher levels
of education are indeed the source of «sobber second thought» about restricting the rights of those one
opposes. Our first and second hypotheses are linked in that we expect cognitive sophistication to mediate
245 the effect of education on tolerance even once feelings toward the target have been controlled. A principal
reason why increasing years of education leads to respect for the rights of those one opposes is the greater
|