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150 of the risk. The perceptions can change rapidly — the risk itself stays the same. Of course, we do not know
the risk itself. All we know is the perception of that risk by an expert. But some people reject experts.
10 Another active proponent in the nuclear field also has commented on the difficulty of dealing with
155 perceptions. Bernard Cohen, professor of nuclear physics and radiation health at the University of
Pittsburgh, wrote:
«The American public must be educated on these matters [health, safety, and economics of nuclear
160 power]. He noted the difficulty he has had in trying to get across the concept of radiation damage to
humans and of levels of acceptable exposure.
The Role of the Media
11 Are the media the problem? Have the risk analyses been done well, but have the media described
165 them poorly? Is it the media who are really at fault in the difficulty that risk analysis have in getting
analyses accepted? Philip Abelson, in an editorial in «Science», seemed to blame the media when he wrote:
«When mentioned by the media, the polychlorinated biphe-nyls (PCBs) are described as cancercausing
170 chemicals. A more precise statement would be that huge daily lifelong doses of some of the PCBs are
cancer'causing in rats».
12 Several years ago, the National Research Council Committe on Risk Perception and Communication
175 addressed the question of whether the media are really the heart of the problem: «It is mistaken to view
journalists and the media always as significant, independent causes of problems in risk communication».
The committee did note that «most news organizations would not tolerate sports or business reporting by
reporters who do not understand the subject.
180 ... The same is not always true of the reporting of the technical and social dimensions of risk messages.»
However, the committee advised:
What is needed are ways to improve risk communication by helping scientists and decision-makers
185 understand how and why journalists do their work and by helping journalists understand how scientists and
decision-makers think and interact.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
13 Where, then, can solutions be found to effectively apply risk analysis to public policy? The public is
190 struggling with some inconsistencies but perhaps becoming more scientifically literate, and the media
cannot be counted on, although they should not be blamed. Perhaps one should look to the U.S. Congress.
Unfortunately, Congress is probably not the right place to look for the solutions. In March 1992, Senator
195 Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) spoke in the Senate. He was not talking about the kind of risk analysis addressed
here, but what he said is germane:
We are unable, institutionally, to do what has to be done. We are literally not watching the fiddler fiddle
200 while Rome burns, we are watching the entire orchestra.
This is similar to a recent description of the DOE: «They are economic with the truth».
COST OF REGULATION
205 14 Difficulties in estimating and explaining risks can lead to misallocation of resources. Perhaps the
government and the public are not 'accurately identifying the most serious risks. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), although it appropriately gets many criticisms, has tried to force agencies
210 to estimate how much their regulations cost per life saved or health effect prevented. In the fiscal-year
1992 budget, 0MB estimated the costs of some EPA regulations. In 1990 dollars per premature death
prevented, the estimates from 1980 to the present range from $100,000 for regulations on unvented space
215 heaters, automobile seat belts, and underground construction standards to $6 trillion for regulations on
wood-preserving chemicals. Although the $6 trillion could be a miscalculation or an exaggeration, the 16
other regulations ranged from $13 million to $650 million and 3 were greater than $4 billion. One might