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60
§ 1. The categories of person and number are closely connected with each other. Their ediate connection
is conditioned by the two factors: first, by them situational semantics, referring the process denoted by the verb
to the subject of the situation, i.e. to its central substance (which exists in inseparable unity of "quality"
reflected in the personal denotation, and "quantity" reflected in the numerical denotation); second, by their
direct and immediate relation to the syntactic unit expressing the subject as the functional part of the sentence.
Both categories are different in principle from the other categories of the finite verb, in so far as they do not
convey any inherently "verbal" semantics, any constituents of meaning realized and confined strictly within the
boundaries of the verbal lexeme. The nature of both of them is purely "reflective" (see Ch. Ill, § 5).
Indeed, the process itself, by its inner quality and logical status, cannot be "person-setting" in any consistent
sense, the same as it cannot be either "singular" or "plural"; and this stands in contrast with the other properties
of the process, such as its development in time, its being momentary or repeated, its being completed or in-
completed, etc. Thus, both the personal and numerical semantics, though categorially expressed by the verb,
cannot be characterized as process-relational, similar to the other aspects of the verbal categorial semantics.
These aspects of semantics are to be understood only as substance-relational, reflected in the verb from the
interpretation and grammatical featuring of the subject.
§ 2. Approached from the strictly morphemic angle, the analysis of the verbal person and number leads the
grammarian to the statement of the following converging and diverging features of their forms.
The expression of the category of person is essentially confined to the singular form of the verb in the
present tense of the indicative mood and, besides, is very singularly presented in the future tense. As for the
past tense, the person is alien to it, except for a trace of personal distinction in the archaic conjugation.
In the present tense the expression of the category of person is divided into three peculiar subsystems.
The first subsystem includes the modal verbs that have no personal inflexions: can, may, must, shall, will,
ought, need, dare. So, in the formal sense, the category of person is wholly neutralized with these verbs, or, in
plainer words, it is left unexpressed.
The second subsystem is made up by the unique verbal lexeme be. The expression of person by this lexeme
is the direct opposite to its expression by modal verbs: if the latter do not convey the indication of person in
any morphemic sense at all, the verb be has three different suppletive personal forms, namely: am for the first
person singular, is for the third person singular, and are as a feature marking the finite form negatively: neither
the first, nor the third person singular. It cannot be taken for the specific positive mark of the second person for
the simple reason that it coincides with the plural all-person (equal to none-person) marking.
The third subsystem presents just the regular, normal expression of person with the remaining multitude of
the English verbs, with each morphemic variety of them. From the formal point of view, this subsystem
occupies the medial position between the first two: if the verb be is at least two-personal, the normal personal
type of the verb conjugation is one-personal. Indeed, the personal mark is confined here to the third person
singular -(e)s (-z, -s, -iz], the other two persons (the first and the second) remaining unmarked, e.g. comes-
come, blows - blow, stops - stop, chooses - choose.
As is known, alongside this universal system of three sets of personal verb forms, modern English possesses
another system of 'person-conjugation characterizing elevated modes of speech (solemn addresses, sermons,
poetry, etc.) and stamped with a flavour of archaism. The archaic person-conjugation has one extra feature in
comparison with the common conjugation, namely, a special inflexion .for the second person singular. The
three described subsystems of the personal verb forms receive the following featuring:
The modal person-conjugation is distinguished by one morphemic mark, namely, the second person: canst,
may(e)st, wilt, shalt, shouldst, wouldst, ought(e)st, need(e)st, durst.
The personal be-conjugation is complete in three explicitly marked forms, having a separate suppletive
presentation for each separate person: am, art, is.
The archaic person-conjugation of the rest of the verbs, though richer than the common system of person
forms, still occupies the medial position between the modal and b-conjugation. Two of the three of its forms,
the third and second persons, are positively marked, while the first person remains unmarked, e.g. comes
-
comest - come, blows - blowest - blow, stops - stoppest -stop, chooses - choosest - choose.
As regards the future tense, the person finds here quite another mode of expression. The features
distinguishing it from the present-tense person conjugation are, first, that it marks not the third, but the first
person in distinction to the remaining two; and second, that it includes in its sphere also the plural. The very
principle of the person featuring is again very peculiar in the future tense as compared with the present tense,
consisting not in morphemic inflexion, nor even in the simple choice of person-identifying auxiliaries, but in
the oppositional use of shall-will specifically marking the first person (expressing, respectively, voluntary and
non-voluntary future), which is contrasted against the oppositional use of will-shall specifically marking the